Apparently, there was a serious data breach at LinkedIn and many customer records were stolen including “member email addresses, hashed passwords, and LinkedIn member IDs”. LinkedIn sent out a notification informing that the passwords were invalidated. What is interesting in the note is that they included a cryptic note that the break-in was “not new”. What could they mean by that?
On May 17, 2016, we became aware that data stolen from LinkedIn in 2012 was being made available online. This was not a new security breach or hack. We took immediate steps to invalidate the passwords of all LinkedIn accounts that we believed might be at risk. These were accounts created prior to the 2012 breach that had not reset their passwords since that breach.
I can take a wild guess that they passwords prior to 2012 were stored either unencrypted, without salt, or using some very weak algorithm. The security breach itself was, of course, “new” but the only information at risk are those passwords in the database that were stored in this old-fashioned way.
So, according to my wild guess, there must be more information stolen than they tell us but LinkedIn judged that the only information that threatens themselves were those old passwords so they finally invalidated them (what they should have done back in 2012) and told us they are happy with it.Unfortunately, there is no way to know for sure.
You can make your own wild guess at what happened.
The November 2014 breach of security at Sony Corporation remains the subject of conversation throughout the end of the year. Many interesting details have become known while even more remains hidden. Most claims and discussions only serve to create noise and diversion though.
Take the recent discussion of the antivirus software, for example. Sony Corporation uses antivirus software internally, it’s Norton, TrendMicro or McAfee depending on the model and country (Sony uses Vaio internally). So I would not put much stock into the claims of any of the competitors in the antivirus software market that their software would have stopped the attackers. And it’s irrelevant anyway. The breach was so widespread and the attackers had such totality of control that no single tool would have been enough.
The most interesting question remains unanswered though. Why did the attackers decide to reveal themselves? They were in the Sony networks for a long time, they extracted terabytes of information. What made them go for a wipeout and publicity?
Was publicity a part of a planned operation? Were the attackers detected? Were they accidentally locked out of some systems?
What happened is a very important question because in the former case the publicity is a part of the attack and the whole thing is much bigger than just a network break-in. In the latter cases Sony is lucky and it was then indeed “just” a security problem and an opportunistic break-in.
Any security specialist should be interested to know that bigger picture. Sony should be interested most of all, of course. For them, it’s a matter of survival. Given their miserable track record in security, I doubt they are able to answer this question internally though. So it’s up to the security community, whether represented by specialist companies or by researchers online, to answer this most important question. If they can.
I stumbled upon a very interesting infographic that portrays some of the world’s biggest data breaches in a running bubble diagram. Entertaining and potentially useful in presentations Have a look.
France and Belgium Domino Pizza password database was stolen by the hackers of Rex Mundi. They require a 30,000 euro payment to avoid disclosure. Well, Domino Pizza went to police, so the 592,000 French and 58,000 Belgian customer records will be in the open tonight.
What is interesting though? This is 2014. Do you know what they used to store passwords? They used MD5 without salt or stretching. Like if the previous 20 years never happened in their computer universe. We keep reiterating the good ways of storing passwords over and over again and nobody listens.
Domino said in a statement: ‘The security of customer information is very important to us. We regularly test our UK website for penetration as part of the ongoing rigorous checks and continual routine maintenance of our online operations.’
I can feel sympathy to the challenges of securing a large network where you have to get many things right. If you only do penetration and ignore all the other things, you will end up with a false sense of security. Judging by them not knowing how to store the passwords, that’s exactly what happened. Penetration testing can supplement but never replace an all-encompassing security program.
The only upside is that Domino apparently stored credit card details separately and the financial data has not fallen into hackers’ hands. So, that’s good.
More: at The Guardian, Daily Mail, The Register.
There is news that women’s clothing website Unique Vintage has sent notifications to the customers that the site has been breached and the customer information was exposed. What is interesting is that the website is fully PCI compliant, i.e. it follows all rules for security set forth by the credit card industry. And still, it appears, the credit card numbers, among other information, were stolen. And this went on for more than a year and a half before being detected.
There is no substitute for proper design and security diligence. Following the rules set in a book will only get you so far. The attackers do not follow any book strictly, so you should not.